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Abstract 
When two individuals alternate reaching responses to visual targets presented on a 
shared workspace, one individual is slower to respond to targets occupying the same 
position as their partner’s previous response. This phenomenon is thought to be due to 
processes that inhibit the initiation of a movement to a location recently acted upon. 
However, two distinct forms of the inhibition account have been posited, one based 
on inhibition of an action, the other based on inhibition of an action and location. 
Furthermore, an additional recent explanation suggests the phenomenon is due to 
mechanisms that give rise to action congruency effects. Thus the three different 
theories differ in the degree to which action co-representation plays a role in the 
effect. The aim of the present work was to examine these competing accounts. Three 
experiments demonstrated that when identical actions are made, the effect is 
modulated by the configuration of the visual stimuli acted upon and the perceptual 
demands of the task.  In addition, when the co-actors perform different actions to the 
same target, the effect is still observed. These findings support the hypothesis that this 
particular joint action phenomenon is generated via social cues that induce location-
based inhibition of return rather than being due to shared motor co-representations.   
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1. General Introduction 
     The past decade has seen increasing interest in the effect of interpersonal 
interaction on human cognition (Atmaca, Sebanz, & Knoblich, 2011; Atmaca, 
Sebanz, Prinz, & Knoblich, 2008; Frischen, Loach, & Tipper, 2009; Schuch & Tipper, 
2007; Tsai, Sebanz, & Knoblich, 2011; Welsh, et al., 2005). Such research has 
revealed novel insights concerning cognitive processes that have previously been 
studied with individuals, including visual attention and motor performance. Focusing 
upon the latter behaviors, recent interest in ‘joint action’ is in part due to the 
acknowledgement that many everyday human visuomotor behaviors involve 
interaction with others, or acting in the close presence of others.  
 
     Joint action work has most often been placed within the context of models that link 
action and perception (Hommel, 2009; Jeannerod & Frak, 1999; Knoblich & Sebanz, 
2006; Prinz, 1997). The basis of these models is that rather than being separate, 
perception and action share cognitive representations. It follows that when two or 
more people act together, the observation of one individual’s action by another 
activates the motor system of the observer. Co-representation of perceived and 
performed actions has received much support (see Blakemore & Frith, 2005; Wilson 
& Knoblich, 2005 for reviews). Sebanz, Knoblich and Prinz (2003) demonstrated this 
phenomenon using the Simon spatial compatibility task (Simon, 1970). When this 
task is performed alone, a discrimination of a stimulus is made that has two 
dimensions. The dimension to be discriminated (for example, a color) is non-spatial 
but the other dimension is spatial (for example, an arrow). Participants make 
discriminations using buttons placed spatially so that they can be spatially congruent 
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or incongruent with the stimuli. Typically, congruent responses are faster than those 
that are incongruent. Sebanz, et al. found that this occurred when two individuals 
were each responsible for making a single discrimination response but did not do so 
when a single person performed one such response, i.e., in the absence of a co-actor. 
The so-called Social Simon Effect (SSE) has been interpreted as evidence that 
individuals represent the actions and/or task of another, as if they were their own 
(Dolk, et al., 2011; Sebanz, Knoblich, & Prinz, 2005b; Sebanz, Knoblich, Prinz, & 
Wascher, 2006 but see Dolk et al., 2011).  
 
    Another example of a joint action effect that has generated a considerable amount 
of interest, and central to the present work, concerns social inhibition of return (social 
IOR; in which the actions of one individual can lead to inhibition in an observer. In 
the basic experiment, participants sit facing each other and take turns to respond to 
targets presented on a flat workspace positioned between them (Figure 1).  Results 
typically show that an individual is slower to initiate a response to a stimulus 
presented at the same location as their partner’s previous response. Welsh et al. 
explained the effect with a combination of the action-perception models referred to 
above, the mirror neuron system, and inhibition of return (IOR; Posner & Cohen, 
1984). Specifically, since inhibition is a known consequence of action (e.g., Howard, 
Lupáñez, & Tipper, 1999; Tremblay, Welsh, & Elliott, 2005; Welsh & Pratt, 2006), 
the authors argued that the observer may inhibit an action based on one previously 
observed. In other words, the same inhibitory processes are evoked when a participant 
observes another person act on a location and when they act upon the location 
themselves. Furthermore, Welsh et al. posited that the mirror neuron system (Fogassi, 
Ferrari, Gesierich, Rozzi, Chersi, & Rizzolatti, 2005; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004) 
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could play a role in this process. Mirror neurons are found in parietal and premotor 
areas of macaque monkeys and recently in a network of cortical and subcortical areas 
in humans (Fabbri-Destro & Rizzolatti, 2008; Mukamel, Ekstrom, Kaplan, Iacoboni, 
& Fried, 2010). These neurons are activated both during the performance and 
execution of a specific action and may be responsible for directly creating motor 
representations when an action is observed (di Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, & 
Rizzolatti, 1992; Filimon, Nelson, & Hagler, 2007; Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & 
Rizzolatti, 1996). The final aspect of Welsh et al.’s theory concerns IOR. It is been 
well-established that after shifting attention to a location, a person will inhibit 
responses to stimuli appearing at the same location (Kingstone & Pratt, 1999; Klein, 
2000; Posner & Cohen, 1984; Rafal, Calabresi, Brennan, & Sciolto, 1989). Although 
the precise mechanisms underlying IOR are debated, it is widely thought that 
attentional and oculomotor processes are slowed in reorienting to previously cued 
regions of space. This phenomenon is manifested by a delay in manual response time 
(RT) to respond to targets that are previously cued, relative to those that are uncued. 
Thus, Welsh et al. argued that the above processes act together to generate the basic 
effect. 
 
    In later work, Welsh and colleagues have provided further evidence that action co-
representation can influence social IOR (Welsh, McDougall, & Weeks, 2009). In a 
modification to the basic social IOR paradigm, participants now sat side-by-side 
rather than facing one another. As before, each took turns to reach out to one of two 
targets appearing on a tabletop. One target could occur on the right of the participant 
sitting on the right, another target could appear on the left of the participant sitting on 
the left, and a third target could appear at a position located between the two and was 
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used by both participants. In accordance with the usual social IOR finding, results 
showed that responses were relatively slow when a reaching response was made to the 
same target as their partner’s previous response. However, participants were also 
slower when making the same egocentric response as their partner. In other words, a 
participant sitting on the right would be slower to respond to their right hand target 
when their partner had also just made a rightward response. Thus, a partner’s arm 
action movement appeared to be represented, rather than simply their response 
location.  
 
    The action co-representation account of social IOR does not however concur with 
recent work examining whether social IOR represents other aspects of actions. Cole, 
Skarratt, and Billing (2012; see also Ondobaka, de Lange, Wiemers, Newman-
Norlund, & Bekkering, 2012) undertook a variant of the basic social IOR procedure in 
which participants reached to a location and either performed the same end-point 
action as their partner (e.g., both writing a digit with a pencil) or performed a different 
end-point action (e.g., one writes a digit, the other erases a digit). This was partly 
motivated by evidence showing that perceptuo-motor representations are sensitive to 
action goals and end states (e.g. Fogassi, et al., 2005; Iacoboni, et al., 2005). Cole et 
al. however showed that the magnitude of social IOR was independent of action goal 
compatibility. Although it could be argued that the mechanisms that cause social IOR 
do represent actions but not their goals, these findings fit better with the alternative 
inhibitory account of the basic effect. Cole et al. (2012) suggested that when an 
individual responds to a spatial location this will direct an observer’s perceptuo-motor 
processing to that location. Consequently, IOR will be generated resulting in slower 
RTs to targets appearing at the responded-to location. In effect, the target and the 
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subsequent arm reach elicits the same orienting response as does the central or 
peripheral cue in the standard IOR paradigm.  
 
    Ondobaka et al. (2012) have recently presented a further account of the basic arm 
movement phenomenon in which the effect was placed within the context of action 
congruency mechanisms. Performing an action is known to facilitate the initiation of a 
similar action in an observer. For instance, Liepelt, von Cramon, and Brass, (2008; 
see also, Brass, Bekkering, Wohlschlager, & Prinz, 2000; Kilner, Paulignan, & 
Blakemore, 2003) presented photographs of a hand that had a target number placed 
over the image. Observers were required to discriminate the target and make a 
response by lifting either their index or middle finger. The important manipulation 
was that the hand on the photograph had either its index or middle finger raised. 
Results showed that when the target required the middle finger to be raised reponses 
were faster if the depicted hand also had the middle finger raised. The same effect 
occurred for the index finger. With respect to the present effect, Ondobaka et al. 
argued that when a participant sees their co-actor perform a particular action this 
facilitates the same action performed themselves within an egocentric framework. For 
instance, if a co-actor sees their partner reach to their right this facilitates a rightward 
reach when they themselves are required to reach to their right on the next trial. 
Indeed, as well as describing social IOR in terms of slowed responses, the effect can 
also be described as an effect in which RTs are shorter when a co-actor performs the 
same action as their partner.  This description, favoured by Ondobaka et al. is is 
therefore a pure co-representation account, where only action congruency 
mechanisms are implicated.  
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    The principal aim of the present work was to directly examine whether social IOR 
depends on the representation of an observed action, as suggested by Welsh et al. and 
Ondobaka et al. or can be accounted for by orienting mechanisms representing spatial 
locations. In three experiments participant pairs performed variants of the standard 
social IOR procedure in which we manipulated aspects of the stimuli as well as the 
actions each one made in relation to their partner. In Experiments 1 and 2 the actions 
performed by each participant were kept constant with only visual aspects of the 
stimuli being manipulated. If social IOR is caused by action co-representation 
mechanisms, no modulation of the basic effect should occur because observed and 
performed actions were identical across the two levels of the action factor (i.e., same 
location as previous response or different location). In direct contrast to Experiments 
1 and 2, Experiment 3 manipulated each partner’s actions but kept the stimuli 
identical. In this case, if the action co-representation account holds, then these 
manipulations should modulate the effect because co-actors sometimes performed 
different actions. 
 
2. Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 tested the action co-representation accounts of social IOR by having 
participants make identical responses to one another. As set out above, no modulation 
of the basic effect should be observed under such conditions. Furthermore, whilst the 
action factor was kept constant we manipulated the visual factors known to influence 
IOR. Specifically, we examined whether the perceptual grouping of stimuli influenced 
the effect. It is well established that preattentive segmentation processes can influence 
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the allocation of attention, such that representations can be based upon objects as well 
as spatial location (Duncan, 1984). Studies of IOR have also demonstrated that 
inhibition can be object-based. IOR can spread from one spatial location to another if 
both locations form part of the same object (Jordan & Tipper, 1999) and can travel 
with an object as it moves from one location to another (Jordan & Tipper, 1998; 
Tipper, Jordan, & Weaver, 1999). 
 
    Following the standard social IOR procedure, pairs of participants alternated single 
responses to left and right targets on a shared work surface.  Each ‘placeholder’ 
contained either a single pair of possible targets, a pair of separated targets embedded 
within a rectangular object, a single pair that moved between two locations, or a pair 
separated without the grouping object (Figure 2). To reiterate, if action co-
representation is the mechanism by which social IOR occurs, there should be no 
change in the magnitude of the basic effect across the perceptual grouping conditions 
because actions were kept constant.     
 
2.1. Method 
2.1.1. Participants 
Twenty-four participants (age range 20 - 25 years old, 15 females) completed the 
study in return for course credit.  All participants were right-handed and naive to the 
purpose of the experiment.    
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2.1.2. Apparatus  
A Pentium PC running custom software controlled the display of stimuli and the 
recording of response data. Stimuli were presented on a 22-inch LCD touchscreen 
monitor that was set into the surface of a table. The monitor screen, lay with its 
surface lying 740 mm from the floor and 240 mm from each participant’s ‘home’ 
button. These buttons were serial PC button boxes, which participants rested upon 
when not responding. Home buttons were released when actions where initiated on a 
trial, providing a starting point for response times.     
 
2.1.3. Stimuli 
The stimuli were presented on the touch screen. A central black fixation cross (0.4 
cd/m2) was set against a uniform white (73.7 cd/m2) background. Response positions 
were black squares (0.4 cd/m2) and grouping objects were dark grey (28 cd/m2). 
Position squares became targets by illuminating to white (73.7 cd/m2). Figure 2 shows 
the target stimuli in each condition.  In the condition where participants responded to 
the same pair of single targets (‘same static’ condition), a single target was presented 
to the left and right of fixation at a distance of 175mm as measured from their middle. 
In the condition with pairs of displaced targets (‘displaced ungrouped’ condition) four 
squares were located on the edge of an imaginary rectangle whose longest side was 
350 mm and shortest side was 110 mm, again with the centre 175mm from fixation. 
In the condition where pairs of targets were grouped within the same object 
(‘displaced grouped’ condition) a rectangle surrounded the targets, measuring 140mm 
long and 22mm wide. Finally, in the condition where a set of single targets moved 
towards each participant (‘single moving’ condition), the target positions were the 
same as they were for the separate and same conditions.       
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2.1.4. Design 
A 2 x 4 repeated measures design was employed. The first factor (‘target location’) 
varied the left/right position of a participant’s target in relation to their partner’s last 
target response. This factor had two levels, ‘same’ and ‘different’, which were 
presented pseudorandomly throughout each block of trials. The second factor 
(‘display type’) varied the perceptual aspects of the stimuli as shown in Figure 2. This 
had four levels; ‘single static’, ‘displaced grouped’, ‘displaced ungrouped’ and ‘single 
moving’. The levels of this factor were blocked and counterbalanced according to a 
Latin square design. 
 
2.1.5. Procedure 
Participants were asked to use their preferred hand to rest upon and depress their 
home button whilst maintaining fixation centrally. Upon seeing each target occur, 
they alternated responses rapidly and accurately by reaching with their preferred hand 
and tapping the target on the touchscreen. The first target was responded to by 
Participant A, the second by Participant B, and so on until all the trials were 
completed. The custom software generated pseudorandom target presentations 
according to the following constraints: First, the number of targets presented to each 
participant at left and right locations was equated. The number of targets presented at 
the same side, relative to the previous trial, in comparison with those presented to the 
opposite side was also equal. No target appeared in the same left or right location on 
more than four occasions sequentially. Each block consisted of 209 trials, with the 
12 
 
first trial serving only to begin the response sequence and therefore not included in the 
analysis. This left 52 same trials and 52 different trials for Participant A and the same 
for Participant B, yielding a total of 836 trials in the experiment.  
 
2.2. Results and Discussion 
Reaction times in excess of 1000ms or shorter than 100ms were excluded from further 
analysis. This resulted in the omission of 5.48% of responses. No localization errors 
occurred. 
 
    Figure 3 shows the mean (RTs) for each of the four conditions. A 2 x 4 repeated 
measures ANOVA was performed with display type (single static, displaced grouped, 
displaced ungrouped and single moving) and target location (same or different) as the 
two factors. This revealed a main effect of display type (F(3, 23) = 4.08, p = .010, 
ηp2= .150) as well as a main effect of location (F(1,23) = 61.3, p <.001, ηp2= .727), 
this latter effect being indicative of social IOR. There was also a significant 
interaction between location and display type (F(1,23) = 25.1, p <.001, ηp2= .522).  
Bonferoni-corrected t-tests were used to identify whether social IOR occurred with 
each type of display. These revealed a significant effect when participants acted upon 
a single static object (t(23) = 7.43, p <.001, d = 1.51, two-tailed), displaced grouped 
objects (t(23) = 3.35 p =.003, d = .668, two-tailed), and a single moving object (t(23) 
= 2.82 p =.010, d = .576, two-tailed). When participants acted upon displaced 
ungrouped objects however, no significant effect of location was observed (t(23) = 
.568, p = .576, d = .115, two-tailed).  
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    These results show that the magnitude of social IOR varied according to the 
perceptual groupings of the stimuli. Of particular note was the presence of the effect 
when the two observers acted upon the same object, and its absence when they acted 
upon different objects (i.e., the displaced ungrouped condition). That these perceptual 
manipulations modulated the social IOR effect when all responses generating the 
effect were identical challenges Ondobaka et al.’s view that the effect is due to action 
congruency mechanisms. The results do not however rule out the location inhibition 
account of Welsh et al. (2005); responses were not slowed to a location adjacent to 
that just responded to unless grouped with it. Indeed the results are consistent with a 
visuomotor inhibition account of social IOR.  
 
    Overall the results of Experiment 1 indicate that social IOR codes both object-
based and space-based representations. These results are consistent with the proposal 
that similar orienting mechanisms subserve both social IOR and classical IOR effects.  
Manipulations of these mechanisms can modulate the social IOR effect despite 
participant’s observation of the same act that is performed.  
 
3. Experiment 2 
Experiment 1 showed that, contrary to the pure co-representaion  account of the 
phenomenon (Ondobaka et al. (2012), social IOR can be modulated by perceptual 
grouping processes. This occurred independently of the kind of action that 
participants performed. Nonetheless, it is still possible that the effect occurs as a result 
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of shared perceptuo-motor representations, but these representations may be sensitive 
to action effects and stimuli, including the presence of objects (e.g., Johnson-Frey, et 
al., 2003; Villiger, Chandrasekharan, & Welsh, 2011).  
 
   In Experiment 2, whilst co-actors again performed the same actions as each other 
(i.e., reach to the same location, different location), they undertook either a standard 
detection task, where a reaching response was made to a single target left or right of 
fixation or, alternatively, a discrimination task in which participants responded to a 
square of one colour and ignored a square of a different colour. Not only does this 
allow us to again assess Ondobaka et al.’s action congruency account (because actions 
are kept constant), it also allows us to assess whether the effect shares a fundamental 
characteristic with IOR. A well-established feature of IOR is that it is generally much 
smaller, if present at all, when a discrimination is made between two stimuli, as 
opposed to detection or localization (Kwak & Egeth, 1992; Tanaka & Shimojo, 1996; 
Terry, Valdes, & Neill, 1994). Thus, if social IOR is based on action co-
representation, an effect of similar magnitude should be observed irrespective of the 
task demands (i.e., the actions being the same in both tasks). In contrast, if it is due to 
processes more akin to classical IOR, as suggested by the data from Experiment 1, the 
inhibitory effect ought to be smaller or absent when targets are discriminated than 
when they are merely localized.    
 
      In addition, if attentional/oculomotor processes drive social IOR then the 
magnitude of the effect should be related to classical IOR (i.e., the original form of 
IOR). Such a relationship has been reported by Welsh et al. (2007) who showed that 
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the size of social IOR correlates with that of non-social IOR. Nonetheless, a question 
remains as to whether this relationship was due to participants representing their own 
and another’s goal-directed action in a functionally equivalent way or alternatively, 
whether the observation of another’s action is an attention-capturing event, in the 
manner of a transient cue as presented in a classic IOR paradigm. The current 
experiment therefore also tested whether a relationship was present between 
individual IOR and social IOR. To that end, participants performed both a social IOR 
procedure as well as the standard “three box” precueing paradigm requiring only a 
single Go-No go response (i.e., Posner & Cohen, 1984). This was to determine 
whether a relationship was present when no goal-directed actions were performed in 
the individual IOR paradigm. 
 
3.1. Method 
3.1.1. Participants  
24 participants (22 females, 18-26 years old) were recruited in exchange for course 
credit. None of the participants completed the previous experiment or any other social 
IOR study reported here. All were right-handed. 
 
3.1.2. Apparatus 
All apparatus for the social IOR tasks were as in Experiment 1. The IOR task was 
completed on Apple eMac computers with 17” monitor displays. Stimuli were 
presented and responses recorded using Superlab (Cedrus systems).  
16 
 
 
3.1.3. Stimuli 
For the social IOR tasks, all aspects were as reported in Experiment 1 with the 
following exceptions. In the discrimination task, the two response positions were a 
green (50.6 cd/m2) and red box (10.6 cd/m2), presented simultaneously. For the 
standard IOR task, participants sat 400mm from the display. A green fixation dot was 
presented on a uniform black background. This fixation dot was surrounded by grey 
cue box (28 cd/m2) measuring 3.44° horizontally and 1.71° vertically. This cue box 
illuminated to white following the presentation of the peripheral cue. Target locations 
were light grey boxes (4.72° horizontally and 2.86° vertically) each positioned 2.86° 
horizontally from fixation as measured from the centre. These were surrounded by 
dark grey target cue boxes (positioned 0.43° horizontally and vertically around the 
target box), which illuminated white to cue the target locations. Targets themselves 
were Gabor patches (sinusoidal gratings enveloped by a Gaussian; 2 cycles/deg, 7.9° 
× 7.9°) and were presented in the centre of the peripheral boxes.   
 
3.1.4. Design 
The experiment employed a 2 x 3 repeated measures design. The first factor (‘target 
location’) again manipulated the location of a participant’s target relative to their 
partner’s previous response (i.e., ‘same’ and ‘different’). These were pseudorandomly 
presented within each block of trials as described in Experiment 1. The second factor 
varied the particular kind of IOR task that participants performed (‘task type’). This 
had three levels, ‘social IOR localization’, ‘social IOR discrimination’ and ‘individual 
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IOR’. The levels of this factor were blocked and their presentation order fully 
counterbalanced.  
 
3.1.5. Procedure 
The procedure in the social IOR tasks were as described for Experiment 1, with the 
following exceptions. In the social IOR discrimination task, participants were either 
asked to respond to a specific target (red) and to ignore the target located on the 
opposite side of fixation (green). These appeared simultaneously against a white 
background for the 1200 ms response period, following a 350ms fixation period.  In 
the IOR detection task, participants were asked to fixate centrally throughout the 
procedure.  Upon the appearance of the Gabor target in each trial, they were to 
respond as quickly and as accurately as possible by pressing the space bar. Each trial 
began with the presentation of the blank fixation display for 1000ms followed by 
either the left or right peripheral cue for 100ms. The central fixation cue then occurred 
for 750ms after which the target appeared. This remained visible until a response was 
given. Participants completed a single block of 104 experimental trials and 24 catch 
trials in the IOR detection task.    
 
3.2. Results and Discussion 
Four participants were omitted from the analysis. Two because 50% or more of 
responses failed to register with the touchscreen and two because 50% or more of 
responses were greater than 1000ms in the IOR detection task. Of the remaining 
participants, approximately 6.78% of the data was omitted due to responses that failed 
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to register the touch screen, as well as those that were initiated prior to 100ms or after 
1000ms elapsing from the presentation of targets. No localization errors occurred 
within the remaining responses in any of the tasks.  
 
    Mean RTs for the three conditions are shown in Figure 4. A 2 x 2 repeated 
measures ANOVA was performed on the two social IOR task with task type (social 
IOR localization or social IOR discrimination) and target location (same or different) 
as the factors. This revealed a main effect of target location (F(1,19) = 17.9, p <.001, 
ηp2= .485) but no main effect for task type (F(1,19) = 1.22, p =.091, ηp2= .143), again 
confirming the presence of social IOR. There was however, a significant interaction 
between target location and task type, (F(1,19) = 77.5, p <.001, ηp2= .803). As before, 
Bonferoni-corrected t-tests were used to identify whether inhibition occurred at each 
level of task type. These revealed a significant social IOR effect when participants 
performed the social IOR localization task, (t(19) = 7.66, p <.001, d = 1.71, two-
tailed). In the social IOR discrimination task, the test for location revealed a 
significant effect in the opposite direction (t(19) = 2.61, p =.017, d = 0.58, two-tailed) 
providing no evidence for social IOR in this condition. The individual IOR task was 
analyzed separately using a paired-samples t-test.  An IOR effect was also present in 
this task (t(19) = 3.55 p =.002, d = 0.79, two-tailed). A difference score between novel 
and return locations was calculated for each participant for the two tasks where IOR 
was observed. This was to assess whether performance in the IOR task (M = 20.9, SD 
= 26.4) was correlated with performance in the social IOR localization task (M = 
62.3, SD = 36.4). A Pearson’s bivariate correlation confirmed a significant 
relationship between these two difference scores (r = .372, p < 0.05). 
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    The results of Experiment 2 are consistent with those of Experiment 1; social IOR 
can be modulated according to visual and task demands when action responses remain 
the same. Inhibition was evident in terms of individual IOR and social IOR 
localization responses, but not in the social IOR discrimination task. Furthermore, the 
findings also support the prediction that there would be a relationship between 
performance on the individual IOR and social IOR localization tasks. As such, these 
results once again cast doubt on the idea that social IOR is mediated by action 
congruency mechanisms (i.e., Ondobaka et al. 2012) since no effect was observed in 
the discrimination condition when an action was congruent with respect to the 
previous response. However, the fact that the effect shares a characteristic with IOR, 
that is, its reduced magnitude when a person is required to perform a discrimination, 
further support the orienting account based on the inhibition of objects and regions of 
space. 
 
4. Experiment 3 
In Experiments 1 and 2 the actions performed by participants were the same (i.e., 
same location or different location with respect to the previous response) with only 
the stimuli and/or task demands being different. In Experiment 3 this was reversed so 
that the stimuli were the same across all conditions but the actions performed were 
different. The congruency of observed and performed actions was manipulated such 
that on half of the trials the co-actors performed the same actions while on the other 
half they performed different actions. If shared perceptuo-motor representations such 
as action congruency are responsible for social IOR, the effect should be diminished if 
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the kinematics of the observed action differs from those performed by the observer 
(Brass, Bekkering, & Prinz, 2001; Calvo-Merino, Glaser, Grezes, Passingham, & 
Haggard, 2005). Experiment 3 therefore examined whether social IOR would occur 
when the observed and performed actions were different. To that end, participants 
again took part in a social IOR procedure, this time comprising four blocks of trials. 
In one block both participants reached for the target, in a second block both pointed to 
the target, in a third Participant A reached whilst Participant B pointed, and in the 
fourth Participant A pointed whilst Participant B reached. An action co-representation 
account of social IOR predicts that no basic effect will occur when co-actors perform 
very different actions (i.e., one points, the other reaches out). By contrast the orienting 
account predicts that social IOR will occur in all conditions; a co-actor will cue spatial 
locations by either pointing or reaching. 
 
4.1. Method 
4.1.1. Participants 
The study recruited a sample of 40 different right-handed undergraduates in return for 
course credit (33 females, age 20 - 35 years). None had participated in the previous 
experiments.  
 
4.1.2. Apparatus 
All aspects of the stimuli and apparatus were as reported in Experiment 1. Because 
the different action conditions would give rise to large differences in sensory signals, 
these were controlled by limiting all visible information to a central portion. In line 
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with Skarratt et al. (2010) and Welsh et al. (2005) we therefore masked the peripheral 
transients generated by the reaching action with a barrier placed between the two 
participants. The barrier included an aperture through which the initiation of a 
partners’ reaching action or their point response could be observed, while occluding 
the peripheral target locations and the faces of partners.  
 
4.1.3 Stimuli 
The stimuli used were as in the grouped condition of Experiment 1. This set of stimuli 
allowed each participant to respond to the same target object but at the different 
locations necessitated by the use of the control barrier.   
 
4.1.4. Design 
A 2 x 2 x 2 design was implemented, with three within-participant factors. The first 
factor (target location) again consisted of two levels (same and different). The second 
factor (action) had two levels corresponding to each type of action (point, reach). The 
third factor (congruency) varied whether participants performed the same or different 
actions. This factor had two levels (congruent, incongruent).  The levels of action and 
congruency were blocked into four experimental conditions and presented such that 
each level appeared in two of the four blocks. These four blocks were fully 
counterbalanced.  
 
4.1.5. Procedure     
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This was as reported previously with the following exceptions. When a participant 
responded in the pointing condition, they were instructed to release the home button 
and perform a pointing gesture by extending a single finger in the direction of the 
target, returning their hand to the home button. They were requested to complete this 
gesture as quickly and as accurately as possible. Moreover, they were asked to ensure 
that the gesture was kept low and without extending their arm toward the target so 
that it would be visible through the barrier window.  
 
4.2. Results and Discussion 
Outlier RTs were excluded as in Experiments 1 and 2, and resulted in the removal of 
3.2% of the data.  
 
    The mean RT data are shown in Figure 5, and were analyzed in a 2 x 2 x 2 
ANOVA. Repeated measures factors consisted of target location (same and different), 
action (point and reach) and congruency (same or different).  The main effect of target 
location was significant, F(1,39) = 10.5 p < .002, ηp2= .213, again showing the 
presence of social IOR. There was also a main effect of action, F(1,39) = 9.35, p = 
.004, ηp2 = .193, however that of congruency was not significant, F(1,39) = 3.74, p = 
.060, ηp2 = .088. Surprisingly, the lack of a main effect for congruency showed that 
performing the same action as another did not affect the speed of action preparation. 
There was however, a difference in the time to prepare pointing and reaching actions. 
Importantly, there was also no interaction between the three factors, F(1,39) = .369 p 
= .547, ηp2 = .009 and all other interactions were not significant (p>.500). This 
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showed that the presence of the social IOR effect was resistant to whether a pointing 
or reaching action was performed and to whether these actions matched or 
mismatched those of a coactor. 
 
   These results show that social IOR occurred irrespective of whether co-actors 
performed the same or a different action to that of their partner. This reveals that 
participants do not need to perform the same manual action as a co-actor in order to 
inhibit subsequent movements to the same location. Even when an observer reaches 
rather than points (or vice versa), social IOR is still observed. In other words, these 
data suggest that simply directing another person’s attention to a location, irrespective 
of how this is achieved, is enough to induce inhibition in the observer. These findings 
thus show that shared perceptual motor representations are not necessary to observe 
social IOR. Rather, it appears that any attention-capturing social cue is sufficient to 
delay a subsequent response to the same location.  
 
   The current findings also replicate those of Skarratt et al. (2010) who similarly 
employed barriers to restrict peripheral information. Additionally, the present data 
replicate the observation that these effects are small in comparison with either the 
basic effect in non-restricted conditions or the same procedure when peripheral 
transients are masked but participants have access to both gaze and action cues from 
their partner. This is most likely due to the lack of low-level sensory transients visible 
to participants in these conditions, despite the fact that the social information is 
sufficient to detect where a partner has responded.  
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   The present experiment demonstrates that the emergence of social IOR does not 
require co-actors to share an action representation. They do however suggest a trend 
towards overall shorter response times when participants make the same action (e.g., 
they both pointed). A wealth of evidence suggests that observing congruent actions 
facilitates the performance of subsequent actions (e.g. Brass, Bekkering, 
Wohlschläger, & Prinz, 2000; Stürmer, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2000). Despite this 
slight facilitation for performing the same action, the effect failed to reach 
significance and inhibitory mechanisms were not modulated by the nature of the 
action performed. This pattern of data indicates that the present joint action paradigm 
is sensitive enough to reveal differences in reaction time on the basis of observed and 
performed kinematics, if they are present. 
 
5. General Discussion 
     A number of studies have now demonstrated that people are slower to respond to 
stimuli that have been previously responded to by another individual. Two related 
accounts have suggested that this ‘social IOR’ effect (Skarratt et al., 2010) is due to 
co-representing an observed action. The present work investigated whether any form 
of action co-representation is needed for social IOR to occur. In Experiment 1, 
participants alternated responses to target stimuli that differed in their perceptual 
groupings. In Experiment 2 the task demands differed such that participants were 
required to localize or discriminate targets. Importantly, in both experiments the 
response actions remained the same while the perceptual and task demands were 
varied.  In Experiment 3, this pattern was reversed such that the stimuli remained the 
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same but now the actions were manipulated. The findings of all three experiments 
were consistent; when perceptual parameters were varied but action parameters were 
kept constant, social IOR was modulated (consistent with effects reported in the 
classical IOR literature). When, by contrast, perceptual parameters were kept 
constant, but response actions were manipulated, there was no modulation of the 
social IOR effect. Instead, social IOR was present, and to the same magnitude, when 
the observed and performed actions differed.  
 
    The results do not therefore support the action co-representation account of 
Ondobaka et al. (2012) and the strictest form of the Welsh et al. (2005; 2007) account. 
Ondobaka et al. (2012) put forward what may be called a ‘pure’ co-representation 
account, suggesting that the effect is due to participants representing a physical 
imitative movement within an egocentric framework. For example, if one participant 
makes a reaching response to their left an observer will be quicker to initiate the same 
action themselves (i.e., reach to their own left). The current data are not compatible 
with this particular action co-representation account. In Experiments 1 and 2 co-actors 
performed identical actions to each other, that is, they reached to their right or left. 
Despite this, the size of the social IOR effect was modulated according to perceptual 
and task conditions. Perhaps more critical for this account were the results of 
Experiment 3. Even when participants performed two distinctly different goal directed 
actions (pointed or reached) social IOR was still observed.  
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    The action co-representation account of Welsh et al. (2005; 2007) states that since 
inhibition is a known consequence of a prior action (e.g., Howard, et al., 1999; 
Tremblay, et al., 2005; Welsh & Pratt, 2006), and that observing an action is 
functionally equivalent to performing it oneself (Sebanz, Knoblich, & Prinz, 2003; 
Sebanz, Knoblich, & Prinz, 2005a) it therefore follows that inhibition is induced when 
a participant observes another person acting on a location. According to this account, 
action co-representation does not facilitate the same physical movement but instead 
triggers the same spatial inhibitory mechanisms associated with performing two 
consecutive actions. However in the present Experiment 3, inhibition associated with 
a location was induced in an observer even though the observed co-actor had not 
acted upon it, only pointed to it. With the strictest interpretation of Welsh et al.’s 
account then, our data do not support their view that the inhibition of a location 
necessarily requires an action to be made upon it. However, it is possible that any 
observed action is sufficient to activate an inhibitory action-location map providing it 
indicates an object or location. In this case, a pointing response may therefore be 
functionally equivalent to a reaching response in activating such a map. At present 
this remains only an intriguing possibility, however one which suggests that pointing 
responses, like reaching and eye gaze direction belong to a class of social cues that 
orient observers to regions in space. It may of course be debatable as to what 
constitutes acting on a location. Indeed, pointing at a target position and reaching 
toward one may be functionally equivalent instances of performing a goal-directed 
action. Welsh et al. (2005) did argue that social IOR was an evolved mechanism 
concerned with visual search. Specifically, it is uneconomical to search where another 
individual has just searched. If search efficiency is the critical component then 
pointing to a location presumably indicates that that location has been examined by 
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the pointer.  Recall that head and eye gaze alone is sufficient to generate social IOR 
(Skarratt et al., 2010). The effect may therefore be caused by a range of potential 
cues, which indicate the location that another person has previously explored. It may 
therefore be that IOR is itself co-represented as part of joint search activity.  It has 
been shown that higher level processes such as inhibitory control and visual search 
strategies can be shared across co-participants in the same task (Dale, Kirkham, & 
Richardson, 2011; Schuch & Tipper, 2007). It is possible that some joint co-
representation of attention therefore occurs, eliciting social IOR during joint search. 
 
 
     In contrast to action co-representation, the present data is consistent with the view 
that the effect has more in common with classical IOR. Like its solitary counterpart, 
social IOR is sensitive to the object or location attended, rather than the particular 
response made toward that location (Jordan & Tipper, 1998; Tipper, Driver, & 
Weaver, 1991). Indeed, the present results are consistent with findings within the IOR 
literature. For instance, it has been shown that IOR is demonstrated to cued locations, 
when the response is a manual pointing movement (Fischer, Pratt, & Neggers, 2003). 
In addition, the data are consistent with work indicating that pointing gestures do 
automatically orient attention (Langton & Bruce, 2000), as do other types of central 
cue including goal directed reaching, as well as eye and head direction (Driver, et al., 
1999; Friesen & Kingstone, 1998; Frischen, Bayliss, & Tipper, 2007). Furthermore, 
the abolition of the effect when co-actors are required to make a discrimination 
judgment also concurs with what is known about IOR (Tanaka & Shimojo, 1996; 
Terry, et al., 1994). 
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    An account of social IOR in terms of attentional/oculomotor reorienting and may 
help to develop the interpretation of previous findings in the literature. For example, 
Welsh, et al. (2009b) found that participants with high functioning autistic spectrum 
disorder (ASD) did not show inhibition when compared to typically developing 
controls. The authors here suggest that these findings may be as a result of differences 
in action co-representation between ASD populations and controls, namely mirror 
neuron dysfunction. Nonetheless, there is much support in the literature for 
dissociations between ASD and control participants in orienting attention to social 
cues such as gaze (see Frischen, et al., 2007 for a revew; Ristic, et al., 2005; Senju, 
Tojo, Dairoku, & Hasegawa, 2004). Conversely, some evidence speaks against 
dysfunctions of action co-representation in ASD participants during joint action 
(Sebanz, Knoblich, Stumpf, & Prinz, 2005). As Skarratt et al (2010) demonstrated in 
typically developing populations, both head/eye gaze and action cues are sufficient to 
observe social IOR. Welsh et al. may therefore have made the novel contribution that 
ASD participants show different orienting behaviors to both eye gaze and action cues. 
This interpretation would be consistent with the present findings and a general model 
of social IOR as a visual orienting phenomenon.  
 
The present work showed that for inhibition, a performed action does not need 
to be the same as that observed when both are directed to the same side of a 
participant’s visual field. Welsh et al. (2009a) also found inhibitory effects when 
participants aimed actions toward the same side of visual space to those just observed. 
An account of social IOR based on orienting may explain the results of both of these 
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studies. In both Welsh et al. and in the current data, slowest responses occur when 
attention must be oriented in the same direction as a previously observed and this 
action is made to the same target object. Furthermore as in Welsh et al.’s paradigm, 
some response slowing was present when observed and performed responses were 
made to the same area of visual space but to different locations, relative to those made 
towards the opposite side of visual space. Finally, in the present findings, when 
participants made different kinematic responses to those observed, those made to the 
same side of visual space were relatively slowed. When these studies are considered 
together, clearly visual factors are critical in determining whether inhibition is 
present. They both therefore support an account of social IOR based upon the spatial 
location of action, rather than the nature of the observed movement.     
 
        Whilst behaviorally, social IOR seems to be an IOR–like effect that is socially 
modulated, a further question remains concerning whether it is subserved by district 
neural processes. The current findings suggest that similar networks that underlie IOR 
may generate the effect.  In particular the superior colliculus is thought to have a key 
role in generating individual IOR, alongside structures involved in spatial working 
memory, which are thought to maintain a mapping of the visual environment in 
spatiotopic coordinates (e.g., Sumner, Nachev, Vora, Husain, & Kennard, 2004). 
Experiment 1, which revealed inhibitory tagging to objects and locations in the 
response environment indicates that similar structures may contribute to social IOR.  
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      A partial limitation of the current study, is that only RTs (i.e., the time taken to 
initiate a movement following the presentation of a stimulus) were measured as an 
index of social IOR. RTs were appropriate both theoretically, due to the prediction 
that attentional manipulations would modulate the effect in Experiments 1 and 2 as 
well as practically because movement latencies of pointing responses could not be 
measured using the touchscreen in Experiment 3. Previous studies have not 
demonstrated action slowing effects occurring between the initiation and the 
execution of responses, indicating that the effect is generated at the perceptuo-
attentional or response planning stages of processing (Skarratt, et al., 2010; Welsh, et 
al., 2005; Welsh, et al., 2007; Welsh, et al., 2009b). As we set out above, the current 
findings are consistent with this interpretation as manipulations of perceptual aspects 
of the response environment, modulated social IOR. Specifically, Experiment 1 
showed that social IOR is sensitive to whether the observed action is performed on the 
same object as the executed action. This is highly consistent with demonstrations of 
the same effect in solitary IOR tasks between cue and target. In addition, and also 
consistent with the IOR literature, Experiment 2 demonstrated that social IOR is 
limited to localization of targets, rather than discrimination of two stimuli at the SOA 
used in the current experiments (1300-1700ms). Both of these results concur with the 
findings of Hayes et al. (2010) who found that slowed responses following sensory 
transients and another’s actions were roughly equivalent. In individual manual aiming 
paradigms however, when a goal-directed reaching response is made, an identical 
action to the same location can be delayed in response time yet facilitated in 
movement time (Tremblay, et al., 2005). Moreover, if social IOR does have a co-
representational component, this may manifest itself in movement times. 
Additionally, although Experiment 3 of the current study found no RT benefit for 
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performing the same manual gesture, a number of studies have identified facilitation 
for matching performed to an observed goal-directed action by response effector. This 
manipulation has been found to affect response following action cues in attentional 
cueing paradigms (Belopolsky, Olivers, & Theeuwes, 2008). In other work involving 
transfer of learning however, intra-manual transfer has been shown to be present 
following action observation using non-mirrored effectors (Hayes, Andrew, Elliott, 
Roberts, & Bennett, 2012). The role of response hand remains an important question 
in the social IOR paradigm.  
  
    The literature on joint action makes a distinction between the co-representation of a 
partner’s task and of their action. For example, tasks where spatially compatible 
stimuli elicit co-representation of another’s action can also be modulated when 
participants either respond to the same or different non-spatial dimensions of the 
stimuli (Atmaca, et al., 2011; Sebanz, Knoblich, et al., 2005a). Jointly acting 
participants may therefore co-represent both the action and the task of another. The 
possibility remains that, even if social IOR is caused by orienting to locations, co-
representation of the other’s task may contribute to the effect. For example since the 
present paradigm is turn-based, its structure clearly indicates when a partner will 
perform an action and this can be used to prepare participant’s own responses. Thus 
co-representing the partner’s task may remain crucial to monitoring another’s action 
and orienting to their responses.     
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     In sum, the present set of experiments has shown that when a response is observed, 
goal-directed aiming movements to the same object and location are slowed. This 
effect is modulated by task factors known to affect performance in individual IOR 
studies. No evidence was found for inhibitory coding made on the basis of observing 
a particular action and therefore the co-representation of motor responses. The current 
findings support an account of social IOR wherein attention is slowed to return to 
locations that have been responded to by another human agent. 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1: The response environment. Participants are depicted with their preferred 
hand resting in the ‘‘home” position, before they alternated responses to targets 
appearing in the left or right positions. Measurements are not drawn to scale. 
Figure 2: Stimulus positions in Experiment 1.  
Figure 3; Mean RTs to initiate responses to targets as a function of object type and 
their position relative to partner’s prior response, in Experiment 1. Standard error of 
the mean bars are included. 
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Figure 4: Mean RTs to initiate responses to targets as a function of task type and their 
position relative to partner’s prior response, in Experiment 2. Standard error bars are 
included. 
Figure 5: Mean reaction times for initiation toward target locations across each 
condition of action performed by participants in relation to those of partners.  Error 
bars represent the standard error of the mean.  
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